This paper develops a model of the interaction between the supply of hatecreating stories from politicians and the willingness of voters to listen to hatred. Hatred is fostered with stories of an out-group's crimes, but the impact of these stories comes from repetition not truth. Hate-creating stories are supplied by politicians when such actions help to discredit opponents whose policies benefit an out-group. Egalitarians foment hatred against rich minorities; opponents of redistribution build hatred against poor minorities. Hatred relies on people accepting, rather than investigating, hate-creating stories. Hatred declines when there is private incentive to learn the truth. Increased economic interactions with a minority group may provide that incentive. This framework is used to illuminate the evolution of anti-Black hatred in the United States South, episodes of antiSemitism in Europe, and the recent surge of anti-Americanism in the Arab world.
I. INTRODUCTION
From the Thirty Years' War to the Holocaust to the contemporary wars in Rwanda and the Balkans, much of human misery is due to religious and ethnic conflict. Easterly and Levine [1997] find that ethnic strife is a major cause of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. Alesina and LaFerrara [2000] document that racial heterogeneity decreases social capital. Ethnic conflict increases corruption [Mauro 1995] and decreases the quality of government [La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1999] . People support redistribution less when that redistribution aids people of different races [Luttmer 2001] ; there is less income redistribution in countries or states that are ethnically divided [Alesina and Glaeser 2004] . Suicidal acts of terror, such as those of September 11, 2001 , in which members of one group die to destroy members of another group, underscore the importance of intergroup hatred. In this paper I try to understand the formation of grouplevel hatred, defined as the willingness of members of one group to pay harm to memb ers of another group.
Some suggest that ethnic conflict automatically accompanies visible group differences [Caselli and Coleman 2002] , but history shows that many hatreds are quite volatile. Hatred arises between groups that resemble each other closely, such as American northerners and southerners in 1861. Peoples who look quite different can often coexist peacefully. Hatreds rise and fall. Before 1945, Franco-German hatred was a regular part of European life; it is no longer. Anti-Americanism is now common in the Middle East [Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004] , but it was not always so: "anti-Americanism developed later in the Middle East than it did in Europe and Latin America" [Rubin and Rubin 2004] . White hatred of African-Americans has fallen since its Jim Crow heyday. Even anti-Semitism, among the most permanent forms of hatred, has declined substantially in the West since 1945. As I discuss in Section II, hatred is almost always internally consistent: people say that they hate because the object of their hatred is evil. This fact leads some observers to think that hatred is caused by the crimes of the object of hatred. Chomsky [2001] argues that American behavior is the cause of anti-Americanism. Yet the relationship between hatred and the criminality of the hated group is often minimal. While Nazis may have believed stories of Jewish atrocities and southern racists may have thought that Blacks presented a threat to southern womanhood, freed slaves and German Jews are relatively innocent. The best evidence that: "anti-Semitism has fundamentally nothing to do with the actions of Jews, and therefore fundamentally nothing to do with an anti-Semite's knowledge of the real nature of Jews, is the widespread historical and contemporary appearance of antiSemitism, even in its most virulent forms, where there are no Jews, and among people who have never met Jews" [Goldhagen 1997, p. 41] In fact, anti-Semitism, anti-Black hatred, and anti-Americanism have all been fostered by false stories manufactured and spread by "entrepreneurs of hate." Woodward [2002] describes how race hatred in the postbellum South "was furthered by a sensational press that played up and headlined current stories of 1. These figures combine the respondents who say that they have a highly unfavorable opinion of Americans with respondents who say that they have a somewhat unfavorable opinion of Americans. The Pew Report is available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportIDϭ165.
Negro crime, charges of rape and attempted rape, and alleged instances of arrogance . . . . Already cowed and intimidated, the [Black] race was falsely pictured as stirred up to a mutinous and insurrectionary pitch" [p. 123] . German politicians spread antiSemitic stories for political reasons. Joseph Goebbels emphasized that the power of Nazi anti-Semitism stemmed from repetition, not accuracy: "If you repeat a lie often enough, it becomes the truth." According to the 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World, 89 percent of Kuwaitis and 96 percent of Pakistanis do not believe that Arabs destroyed the World Trade Center, and the residents of these countries were more likely to blame the United States and Israel for the attacks [Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004] .
This paper investigates when political entrepreneurs will supply hate-creating stories to further their own objectives. In Section III, I present a model in which politicians with the resources and incentives to supply hate-creating stories interact with people who may lack the incentives to properly investigate those stories. Politicians differ in their income redistribution policies and can spread hate-creating stories about the dangerous character of a minority or out-group. Voters who hear these stories think they might be true and will investigate those stories only if there are private benefits from learning the truth. When politicians spread hate-creating stories, they increase the supply of hatred. The willingness of voters to accept these stories without inquiry can be seen as the demand-side of hatred.
The central prediction of the model is that hatred will be spread against poor minorities by antiredistribution candidates (as in Woodward [2002] ) and spread against rich minorities by proredistribution candidates (as in Chua [2003] ). As the minority becomes richer or poorer relative to the majority, the incentive to spread hatred increases because income distribution policies will have a greater impact on the resources of the minority. If political divides concern issues other than income, politicians will build hatred against minorities who stand to gain from their opponent's platform. Thus, nineteenth century European rightists, who supported king, church, and traditional restrictions on Jews, naturally used anti-Semitism against their liberal opponents who favored religious emancipation. Policies that limit contact with minorities, such as bans on immigration, segregation, or genocide, will complement hatred, and their proponents, such as Hitler and Le Pen, will find hatred to be an attractive strategy.
The demand-side of hatred is shaped by the costs and private benefits of information about the out-group. Hatred will not spread among groups who have private incentives to learn the truth about a minority. Integration may deter the spread of hatred because it creates a demand for correct information and reduces the costs of acquiring such information. At the end of Section III, I examine the effects of specific policies that target minorities and that fight hatred by "hating the haters." Antiminority policies can either dampen or exacerbate the incentive to spread hatred, depending on whether they decrease or increase the gap between the parties' treatment of minorities. "Hating the haters," which allows politicians to vilify their hate-mongering opponents, will reduce the level of hatred. If antihate messages are less effective once many in-group members hate, this can create increasing returns to hatred.
Changes in communication technology can both increase and decrease the level of hatred. If cheap newsprint and television reduces the cost of spreading hate, then this change will increase the level of hatred. This effect may explain why anti-Semitism and anti-Black hatred soared in the late nineteenth century. Conversely, better information technology makes it easier to learn that these stories are false and to build hatred against the hate-mongers themselves. As such, the effect of improvements in information technology on hatred is ambiguous and must remain a matter for empirical work.
In Section IV, I use the model to explain the time-series of anti-Black hatred in the American South. I follow Woodward [1951] , who argues that hatred of Blacks was low before the Civil War, rose in the Jim Crow period, and then muted after World War I. The model explains the rise of hatred as a predictable political response to the redistributionist Populist movement of the 1880s. Populists proposed redistribution from rich to poor that would have helped the overwhelmingly poor Black population, and Populists, like Tom Watson, sought support from Black voters. The opponents of the Populists turned to racial hatred as a means of discrediting redistribution. Later, as left-wing politicians in the south embraced anti-Black Jim Crow policies, the incentive to spread hatred declined, and racial demagoguery declined.
In Section V, I use the model to study the spread of political anti-Semitism in nineteenth century Europe. The model can help explain why anti-Semitism was rife in Germany, Russia, and Austria and rarer in England, Italy, and the United States. In the late nineteenth century, Germany, Russia, Austria, and France, right-wing monarchists, who depended on Church support, battled left-wing groups that ranged from liberal to communist. Within this divide Jews were invariably on the left, and "from Stoecker to Hitler, rightists rarely attempted to refute socialism, preferring to cite the high percentage of intellectuals of Jewish origin among socialist publicists as proof of its subversion" [Weiss 1996 ]. In England and the United States the debate over rule by divine right was long over. In Italy the Pope excommunicated all participants in postunification Italian politics, removing religion from political debates. In these countries, where the church was much less political, Jews were not aligned with one party and, as such, were not attractive targets for hatred.
Section VI discusses the political causes of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The central foreign policy of many Middle Eastern leaders, such as the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud, is in alliance with America. Liberals and westernizers within these countries have often preferred even closer ties to the United States. By contrast, Islamic Fundamentalists oppose closeness to any non-Islamic nations, which would violate their interpretation of the Koran and could undermine their social policies. As the United States loses from Islamic Fundamentalist policies relative to either liberals or pro-Western autocrats, Islamic Fundamentalists have naturally turned to anti-Americanism.
The central message of this paper is that hatred is particularly likely to spread against groups that are politically relevant and socially isolated. Thus, anti-Americanism in the Middle East is more inevitable than surprising. Political entrepreneurs in the Middle East differ significantly in their policies toward the United States, and few residents of the Middle East have any incentive to acquire accurate information about Americans.
II. THE FORMATION OF HATRED
Charles Darwin [1979, p. 239] pinpointed the roots of hatred in self-defense and vengeance: "if we have suffered or expect to suffer some willful injury from a man, or if he is in any way offensive to us, we dislike him; and dislike easily rises into hatred." Hatred is an emotional response to the belief that a person or group is dangerous and violates social norms. As Dozier [2002, p. 16] writes, "hate is a primitive emotion that marks for attack or avoidance those things which we perceive as a threat to our survival or reproduction . . ." Baumeister's [1995] lengthy overview of human evil emphasizes that hatred stems from "seeing oneself under attack." He documents that people who "carry out the massacres see themselves as victims of mistreatment and injustice," and "bullies, wife-beaters, tyrants, and other violent people tend to think that other people are attacking or belittling them." Fromm [1973] describes aggression as a "defense against threats to man's vital interests."
2 Daly and Wilson [1988] document that most murders are between acquaintances (especially spouses) and almost always have an element of self-defense or retribution.
Researchers are beginning to understand the physical processes that underlie vengeance. Nisbett and Cohen [1996] examine testosterone and cortisol levels in subjects before and after a provocation, and they find that a provocation causes production of these hormones to increase. The production of these chemicals is linked to aggressive activity.
3 This rise in testosterone is similar to the increase in this hormone that is usually found in people anticipating conflict [Mazur and Booth 1998 ]. As Niehoff [1999] details, when people are threatened, their hormonal systems rapidly produce emotions that help us with an occasionally violent response. Darwin himself sees this emotion as a simple aid to self-defense: "The excited brain gives strength to the muscles, and at the same time energy to the will" [1979, p. 239] . 4 Even economists have documented behavior that has the logic of hate, where "people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to punish those who are being unkind" [Rabin 1993 ]. In an experimental ultimatum game where a first player suggests a division of some prize, such as 10 dollars, and the 2. One modern psychological literature on hatred emphasizes the role of "threatened egotism" or "identity uncertainty," where "violence results when a person's favorable image of self is questioned or impugned by someone else" [Baumeister 1995, p. 376] . While this theory emphasizes vengeance against slights to one's identity (as in Akerlof and Kranton [2000] ), instead of slights to one's income, it is still a model of hatred based on perceived past transgressions.
3. More precisely, Nisbett and Cohen separate subjects into Northerners and Southerners and they hypothesize that Southerners are more vengeful. Testosterone increases in both groups, but a much larger increase among Southerners. Cortisol increased on average, but among Northerners, cortisol fell. Southerners displayed more aggressive actions with provocation, but less aggression in the control sample.
4. Authors such as Posner [1980] , Frank [1985] , and Romer [1995] claim that vengeance evolved because a taste for vengeance protects individuals against expropriation.
second player can either accept this division or reject the division and get nothing, "a robust result in [the ultimatum game], across hundreds of trials, is that proposals that give the Responder less than 30 percent of the available sum are rejected with a very high probability" [Fehr and Gachter 2000] . 5 This behavior is known as reciprocity, reciprocal altruism, fairness, or spite, but in substance (if not in degree) negative reciprocity looks like hate. 6 The formation of hatred involves a cognitive process in which "evidence" about hateful actions is processed into beliefs about the "evil" of a person, creating a desire to weaken or avoid that person. In the ultimatum game experiments described above, the evidence is the unfair offer. Most interpersonal hatreds are based on personal experience, but intergroup hatreds are generally based on stories about crimes of the hated group. These stories range from elaborate novels about international Jewish conspiracies to anecdotes of Blacks or Jews raping white or gentile women.
For example, the young Hitler's lifelong anti-Semitism was apparently primed by materials such as his "favorite tabloid [which] 'revealed' that 'Jewish' pimps, brothel owners, and white slavers seduced Aryan virgins in order to pollute their blood" [Weiss 1996, p. 198] . Hitler then built anti-Semitism by blaming the Jews for the "stab in the back," that allegedly caused Germany to lose World War I. Given the absence of Jews from German political or military leadership, this widespread and often accepted story is patently absurd. 7 Hitler also disseminated The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, shown conclusively by the Times of London to be a forgery in 1921, which described the supposed Jewish conspiracy for world domination [Cohn 1967 ]. Stalin started his 1953 anti-Semitic pogrom with a false allegation that Jewish doctors were poisoners. The story was effective, and "patients refused to accept treatment from Jewish doctors, contending that they would be poisoned" [Heller and Nekrich 1986, p. 503] .
5. Some authors have argued that these experiments only show a dislike of inequality or a preference for relative payoffs [Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 ], but Blount [1995] finds that subjects are willing to accept worse offers when they are generated by a computer.
6. There are differences between economic models of hatred. For example, Rabin [1993] focuses on spiteful responses to actions, while Levine [1998] focuses on spiteful responses to the preferences of others.
7. The one Jew who occupied a position of leadership in the war was the industrialist Walter Rathenau, who was assassinated by the anti-Semitic Freikorps in 1922.
Sometimes these stories are false, but just as often, the stories are true but contain little information because they concern ancient events or a small subset of the hated group. Slobodan Milosevic galvanized his Serbian killers by reminding them of the Turkish victory, and the "martyrdom" of Prince Lazar, at Blackbird's Field in 1389. One or two allegations of assaults against white women were sufficient cause for Whites to attack entire Black communities in race riots such as the 1906 Atlanta riot [Bauerlein 2001 ]. The rioters, who saw themselves as protecting the White race against a Black threat, do not seem to have worried about the truth of the allegations or the innocent Blacks they attacked or the many rapes of African-American women perpetrated by White men.
Why are hate-creating stories powerful even when they are false or essentially uninformative? In the model below, false stories prevail with rational voters when those voters have little incentive to learn the truth behind the stories.
8 After all, in many contexts people do give informative warnings, so when we hear a story about the danger posed by an out-group, it may make sense to be careful and put some weight on the story. Naturally, the entrepreneurs of hate succeed only if they are skilled at making their claims seem genuine and hiding their ulterior motives.
9
A puzzling aspect of group hatred is that people attribute evil to all members of a group, not just specific perpetrators of past crimes. Indeed, hate is often formed using true stories; the cognitive error comes not from believing the story, but rather in leaping from the evil of the specific people to the inference that an entire group is evil. Dozier [2002] suggests that this inference relies on the natural human tendency to group people into categories like "us vs. them." Despite the important role that group identification plays in the growth of hatred, in this paper I will treat group identities as exogenous. 8. This aspect of the demand for hatred is close to the witch hunt model of Mui [1999] .
9. An alternative view is that emotions like hatred involve feeling, not thinking, so that usual Bayesian rules do not exactly apply (as in Romer [2000] ).
10. Another view is that humans leap readily to the view that crimes are caused by something intrinsic in the criminal (such as race) rather than by his circumstances, so we naturally associate the crimes of an individual with the evil of his group.
III. THE MODEL
The heart of this model is that politicians spread hatred when their policies are relatively detrimental to an out-group because hatred creates a desire to impoverish to exclude the out-group. I focus on hatred by an in-group toward an out-group. The out-group may be a minority, like German Jews or AfricanAmericans, or a group that lives outside the country's borders, such as the Americans who are hated in the Middle East. I represent hatred as the belief that the out-group is dangerous. Voters' beliefs about the dangers of interacting with the outgroup are determined by politicians' hate-creating messages and the degree to which voters scrutinize those messages. The basic model has four periods:
(1) Politicians decide whether to broadcast a hate-creating message; (2) In-group members receive signals about the harmfulness of the out-group, decide whether or not to investigate the truth of this message, and decide whether or not to engage in self-protection against the out-group; (3) In-group and out-group members vote for their preferred politician, and the winning politician's policies are implemented; and (4) In-group members may be harmed by out-group members. In-group members vote, search, and self-protect to maximize their expected utility:
(1) Utility ϭ Income Net of Taxes and Transfers ϩ Expected Damage from the Out-Group Ϫ Search Costs Ϫ Self-Protection Costs.
Net income includes endowed income, denoted y, government transfers, and taxes. I assume that the voting is costless and that everyone votes, but that individuals also recognize that individual votes have no impact on electoral outcomes. As a result, individuals gather information to improve their private decisionmaking, but not to improve their decisions in the voting booth.
Out-group members vote to maximize their income net of taxes and transfers. Out-group members are essentially passive in this model (aside from voting), but in the section on "hating the haters," I allow the out-group to respond negatively to politicians who build hate against them.
Politicians maximize their expected popular support minus c i times their electoral spending, where i indexes each politician.
11
The variable c i reflects the difficulty of raising funds, and candidates with better access to funding, i.e., who are richer, will have lower values of c i . While it is easiest to think of the model as reflecting two politicians competing in a democracy, the model's logic also applies to more dictatorial rulers, as long as they are interested in attracting popular support.
The out-group is harmful with probability . With probability 1 Ϫ the out-group is harmless. If the out-group is harmless, then in-group members will suffer no damage from the out-group in the fourth period. If the out-group is harmful, then the in-group members will suffer damage equal to d ỹ O , where d Ͼ 0 and ỹ O is the average after-tax income level of the out-group. If the outgroup is innately harmful, then when the out-group has more resources, the out-group will do more harm.
12
If the out-group is harmful, then in period 2 all in-group members will receive a signal indicating that the out-group is harmful. If the out-group is harmless, in-group members do not receive a signal unless the politician sends a false signal in period 1. There are no positive signals, only negative signals. If no politicians sends a false signal, then the presence or absence of a signal would perfectly inform in-group members about the harmfulness of the out-group.
If a politician does send a signal, I assume that in-group members cannot easily observe the source or veracity of that signal. An example of such a negative signal is The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the ultimate authorship of which was far from obvious. In-group members can only distinguish true signals from false signals sent by politicians if they pay a cost of s. If they pay this cost, then they will learn the truth of the signal and learn whether the out-group is harmful.
11. If a fixed proportion of the population voted randomly, then the politician's probability of being elected would be a monotonic transformation of the number he receives without this random voting.
12. The assumption that the expected damage from the out-group rises with its income runs counter to the view that good behavior increases with wealth, but people who argue that enriching out-groups, such as Blacks or possible terrorists, makes these groups less of a threat are usually trying to reduce hatred. By contrast, people who truly hate these out-groups believe that they would use additional resources to cause harm. Shapiro [2004] presents a model of advertising that explores the assumption that people learn the source of signals only by paying a cost. He argues that uncertainty over the source of signals can come from imperfect memory as well as obfuscation on the part of the signal's sender. Voters with imperfect memory could become uncertain even over the source of negative signals that are contained in political speeches.
I let denote the probability that in-group members place on politicians sending (false) signals about harmless groups. This probability is endogenous and will reflect the actual probability that politicians send false signals. If an in-group member receives a negative signal about the out-group, the in-group member uses Bayes' rule and believes that the out-group is harmful with probability /( ϩ (1 Ϫ )). If an in-group member hears no negative signal, he correctly believes that the out-group is harmless with probability one.
In period 2, after hearing the signal, in-group members chooses whether or not to spend s to learn the truth about that signal and then chooses whether or not to spend r to reduce the expected damage from the out-group members from d ỹ O to ␦ d ỹ O . Spending r reflects actions which reduce contact with the out-group such as avoiding commercial or social interactions with the out-group, moving into a segregated neighborhood, or avoiding certain forms of travel. To simplify analysis, I assume that
Ͼ r, so self-protection is optimal both for in-group members who have learned that the negative signal is true and for in-group members who have not searched to learn the truth of the signal. In-group members who have not heard a negative signal or who have searched and learned that the signal is false will not engage in self-protection since they know that the out-group is harmless.
The investigation decision is based on the potential gains from making wiser decisions about self-protection. If an in-group member does not search, the expected costs from out-group attack and self-protection sum to ␦ d ỹ O /( ϩ (1 Ϫ )) ϩ r. If the in-group member does search, then the expected costs from selfprotection and damage equal zero if he finds out that the story is false or ␦ d ỹ O ϩ r, if he finds out that the story is true. The total expected costs will be ( (␦ d ỹ O ϩ r))/( ϩ (1 Ϫ )), and the gains from search are ((1 Ϫ )r)/( ϩ (1 Ϫ )). There may also be social gains from better knowledge of the group that will occur through better voting, but in-group members do not inter-nalize these benefits since each in-group member recognizes that his own vote does not impact the electoral outcome.
The cost of search, s, differs among members of the in-group. The distribution of s is characterized by density function h(s) and cumulative distribution H(s). The benefits of learning the truth will check politicians' ability to spread lies about the out-group (all propositions are proved in the Appendix): PROPOSITION 1. Learning the truth of the hate-creating story is optimal if and only if s is less than ((1 Ϫ )r)/( ϩ (1 Ϫ )).
If education reduces the cost of learning the truth about these political stories, then less educated people will be more likely to accept false hate-creating stories. This result may explain why more educated people are less likely to give racist responses to survey questions in the United States.
13 During most of the years between 1972 and 1998, the General Social Survey asked respondents whether they favored a law against racial intermarriage and whether they would vote for a qualified Black candidate for President. Less than 7 percent of white respondents with at least a college degree favored banning intermarriage, and more than 93 percent of those well-educated respondents said that they would vote for a qualified Black Presidential candidate. More than 37 percent of respondents with a high school degree or less favored a law against racial intermarriage, and less than 80 percent of these less educated respondents said that they would vote for a qualified Black candidate for President.
14 While the negative connection between education and racist views is strong, these results may not mean that more educated people do not believe that Blacks are a threat. Instead, more educated respondents may have been taught not to publicly display their racism.
Information costs can also decline for people who have contact with the out-group, as interaction can make it easier to acquire the truth. As a result, integration can act to reduce the willingness to accept false hate-creating stories. Integration will also reduce the willingness to listen to these stories if integration 13. When education consists of indoctrination in hate-creating myths, then education may increase hatred (as in the case of many Madrassas; see Gentzkow and Shapiro [2004] ).
14. These differences are highly statistically significant and remain so controlling for other variables, like year of birth. In the General Social Survey, there is also a significant negative relationship between education and responding that Blacks are lazy and live off welfare.
increases the economic returns to knowing the truth about the out-group (as in an earlier version of this paper [Glaeser 2004]) .
If the out-group is harmful, the share of in-group members who believe that the out-group is harmful with probability one equals H(((1 Ϫ )r)/( ϩ (1 Ϫ ))), and the remainder believe that the out-group is harmful with probability /( ϩ (1 Ϫ )). The ability of politicians to spread negative signals reduces voters' trust in negative signals and decreases wariness about a harmful out-group. This effect might explain some voters' unwillingness to accept Winston Churchill's warnings about Nazis in the 1930s. The falsehood of some anti-German propaganda during World War I and the belief that Churchill was somewhat opportunistic reduced Churchill's ability to convince voters of the accuracy of his message.
When the out-group is harmful, politicians will not broadcast a signal because voters will receive a negative signal anyway. Voters will all engage in self-protection, whether they have searched or not, and they will all favor politicians whose policies reduce the threat from the out-group. As this case is straightforward and less interesting, I will focus on the case where the out-group is harmless.
If the out-group is harmless and if a politician sends a false message, then a share, 1 Ϫ H(((1 Ϫ )r)/( ϩ (1 Ϫ ))), of the in-group believes that the out-group is harmful with probability /( ϩ (1 Ϫ )). The remainder of the in-group has searched and learned that the out-group is harmless. I refer to the share of in-group members who hear a negative signal about the outgroup and who do not learn the truth of that signal, as the proportion of in-group members who hate, because these in-group members would prefer to reduce the resources of the out-group. The remainder of the discussion focuses on the hatred on an innocent group.
People who do not search will expect to lose ␦ d ỹ O /( ϩ (1 Ϫ )) from being attacked by out-group members. If taxes reduce the average out-group income by some quantity Q, then in-group members who hate expect that their damage levels are reduced by ␦ dQ/( ϩ (1 Ϫ )). In-group members who believe that the out-group is harmful are more likely to support politicians whose policies weaken the out-group. This tendency creates the incentive for politicians to supply hatred.
III.A. The Supply of Hatred
I now turn to stages 1 and 3 of the model: the politicians' decision to spread hatred and its impact on voting. Politicians can spread hate-creating stories among in-group members at a cost K. K will differ across politicians both because of the politicians' abilities (some politicians may be better at spreading hatred than others) and because in some settings there will be more facts that can be easily distorted by politicians and turned into a negative signal about the out-group. Voters do not observe the value of K, but they do know that K is drawn from a distribution with density f(K) and cumulative distribution F(K).
I assume two politicians with fixed policies. Government policies take the form of redistribution on the basis of income. The proportion of the population that belongs to the out-group is denoted p. The rest of the population belongs to the in-group. The income distribution of the in-group is characterized by density function f I ( y) and cumulative distribution F I ( y); the income distribution of the in-group is characterized by density function f O ( y) and cumulative distribution F O ( y). Income is distributed independently of search costs. Let ⌬ y denote the mean income of the in-group minus the mean income of the out-group.
The two candidates propose tax levels that are both exogenous and binding. A tax rate of implies that people pay or receive net taxes of ( y Ϫ ŷ ). People who are poorer than average receive transfers. The tax levels proposed by the two candidates are denoted R and A , where R Ͼ A . The politician with redistribution level R is the proredistribution candidate; the one with redistribution level A is the antiredistribution candidate. Regardless of group membership or hatred, individuals gain financial returns of ( R Ϫ A )( y Ϫ ŷ ) from supporting the antiredistribution candidate. Out-group voters, and majority voters who believe that the out-group is harmless will vote for the proredistribution candidate if and only if ( ŷ Ϫ y)( R Ϫ A ) is positive, or if y is less than ŷ .
In-group members who believe that the out-group is harmful have an added reason for voting: tax policies will impact the out-groups' income. The gap between average income and average out-group income is (1 Ϫ p) ⌬ y , and the antiredistribution candidate reduces out-group income by ( R Ϫ A )(1 Ϫ p) ⌬ y relative to the proredistribution candidate. Haters will only support the proredistribution candidate if
If P denotes the proportion of majority group members who believe that the out-group is harmful, which equals 1 Ϫ H(((1 Ϫ )r)/( ϩ (1 Ϫ ))), then the share of the population that supports the proredistribution candidate is
Differentiation of equation (2) Politicians benefit from hatred when their policies complement hatred. Proredistribution candidates will spread hatred against a rich out-group; antiredistribution candidates will spread hatred against a poor out-group. Hatred can be a tool of either the left or the right. For example, socialist and labor leaders in the early twentieth century often spread hatred against wealthy capitalists and the bourgeoisie whom their policies would weaken. Chua [2003] describes the current proliferation of hatred spread by populist politicians against wealthy minorities (particularly Chinese immigrants) throughout the world.
Conversely, when the minority is poor, i.e., when ⌬ y Ͼ 0, then hatred becomes a tool of the right. Left-wing policies will tend to enrich the out-group, and the right will likely suggest that the out-group poses a danger that will only rise with its wealth and power. In Section IV, I argue that this logic captures the rise of anti-Black hatred in the postbellum south. The candidate who opposes redistribution can appeal even to voters who lose economically from his policies because these policies will also weaken the out-group.
Hatred against a poor out-group will only impact the voting of middle income in-group members. The very rich always support the antiredistribution candidate; the very poor always support the proredistribution candidate. But voters with moderate incomes only support the antiredistribution candidate when they hate the out-group.
I now assume that ⌬ y Ͼ 0, so that only the antiredistribution candidate will spread hatred. The cost of funds to the antiredistribution candidate is c A . These assumptions imply PROPOSITION 3. There exists a value of K, denoted K*, at which the antiredistribution candidate is indifferent between sponsoring hatred and not sponsoring hatred. 
where K is a constant and v is distributed with cumulative distribution ⌿(v), then the share of antiredistribution politicians that spread hatred is falling with K . The equilibrium value of , which is the belief about how politicians are to spread negative signals about the out-group, equals G(K*), the probability that an antiredistribution candidate will spread a false negative signal. The comparative statics are derived recognizing the fact that parameters impact the returns to spreading hatred both directly and indirectly by changing voters' beliefs about the probability that negative signals are false.
An increase in K*-the maximum that the antiredistribution candidate is willing to spend to spread hatred-can be interpreted as an increase in the supply of hatred (at a given price). As c A falls, K* rises, and hatred becomes more attractive. The value of c A is the candidate's marginal cost of spending, which declines as the financial resources of the candidate increase, so rich candidates may be more likely to spread hatred than poor candidates.
As d rises, in-group members who hate increasingly believe that impoverishing the out-group is needed to keep them safe. A rise in d will increase the complementarity between hatred and low levels of redistribution and also increase the incentive of the antiredistribution candidate to sow hatred. This variable might rise with the size of the out-group or the degree to which the in-group and the out-group are integrated. The positive effect of ␦ occurs for a similar reason. When ␦ rises, the in-group is less able to self-protect and therefore remains concerned about reducing the resources of the out-group.
The variable determines the probability that voters give to the negative signal being correct. When this probability is higher, in-group members are less likely to search, and that makes spreading false signals more effective. Moreover, as rises, ingroup members who do not search believe that the out-group is more of a risk and are more likely to support the antiredistribution candidate who will reduce the resources of the out-group.
The spread of hatred becomes more likely as ⌬ y increases because the out-group gains more from redistribution as it becomes poorer. Whenever an out-group would gain relatively more from one candidate's policies, then it will be attractive for that candidate's opponent to build hatred against the out-group.
Increases in p, the share of the population that is in the out-group, have two effects. First, an increase in p decreases the size of the in-group in the electorate, reducing its influence on the election's outcome. Second, an increase in p decreases the gap between out-group income and average income, thus reducing the degree to which proredistribution tax policies shift income to the out-group. Both effects make hate less attractive. An increase in group size might, however, also increase d, the perceived threat from the out-group, and this effect would work in the opposite direction.
The parameter , defined in Section B of the proposition, allows the out-group to have less or more political power than its numbers would suggest. The amount of hatred declines as the minority's political power increases. Disenfranchised out-groups will be particularly vulnerable to hatred. The extreme example of this phenomenon is foreigners who cannot vote at all and who are therefore particularly attractive targets for hatred. This comparative static distinguishes this model from a model that says that hatred is based on the true threat that minorities pose. In that model, minorities with more political clout might be hated more, whereas in this model, minorities with less political clout are hated more. Of course, in this model, hatred is spread by stories that create fear, so people might falsely believe that the minority is particularly powerful. Anti-Semitic hatred has been frequently accompanied by false beliefs about the power of Jews.
This parameter ŝ represents the cost of acquiring information about the out-group. As this cost falls, hatred becomes less common. This cost might fall because the in-group becomes better educated or better trained at thinking critically about sources of information. Alternatively, the cost might decline because of increased interaction between the in-group and the out-group. Presumably, the in-group will find it easier to learn about the outgroup when members of the in-group know more members of the out-group. Of course, integration might also make the out-group more threatening, and this would have a countervailing effect by raising d.
The parameter K represents the cost of transmitting negative signals about the out-group. As this parameter falls, it becomes cheaper to spread these signals, and even though this leads in-group members to be more skeptical about negative signals, a decline in this parameter will still increase the prevalence of hatred. For example, the spread of anti-Black hatred in the South and anti-Semitic hatred in Germany coincided with both the rise of cheap newsprint and increased literacy, which made it easier for entrepreneurs of hate to disseminate false tales of Black and Jewish crimes and threats. Likewise, religious leaders who specialize in the spread of hatred such as Christian anti-Semitism, and Islamic anti-Americanism, often have a comparative advantage in transmitting stories, whether hate-creating or not.
III.B. Antiminority Policies
I now consider policies that directly penalize out-groups. In addition to its redistributive policies, I assume that the proredistribution party offers a proposed poll tax of R on each out-group member and the antiredistribution party offers a proposed poll tax of A on out-group members. These taxes are then distributed across the majority population. These taxes are meant as a proxy for policies such as Jim Crow schools or laws excluding Jews from public services or particular occupations. I assume that all outgroup members are rich enough to pay these taxes.
If the income densities are uniform, and if there is no hatred in society, then neither candidate gains votes from supporting policies that directly penalize the out-group. Without hatred, expropriating the out-group causes a candidate to lose as many votes as he gains. However, with hatred (and uniform densities), support for either candidate rises when they penalize the out-group.
Support for the antiredistribution candidate will rise with the level of hatred if and only if the antiredistribution candidate is less generous to out-groups, i.e., A ϩ ( R Ϫ A )(1 Ϫ p) ⌬ y Ͼ R , which I assume. In this case,
, then K*, the maximum cost that the antiredistribution candidate is willing to spend to spread hatred, is rising with A and falling with R .
Antiminority policies will increase the supply of hatred when proposed by the antiredistribution party and decrease the supply of hatred when proposed by the proredistribution party. As A rises, the antiredistribution candidate becomes even less favorable to the out-group, increasing the candidate's incentive to spread hate. As R rises, the proredistribution party becomes relatively less favorable to the out-group, decreasing the antiredistribution candidate's incentive to spread hate. The impact of antiminority policies depends on whether they mute or exacerbate the differences in how the candidates treat out-groups.
As before, I treat policies as exogenous, but note that as soon as there is some amount of hatred toward the out-group, both candidates would benefit by proposing antiminority policies. Ethnic conflict may be so common because there are many examples of politicians who both introduce hatred and then propose increasingly harmful policies toward the out-group. Constitutional democracies are able to prevent this escalation through the introduction of explicit constitutional limitations that bar the targeting of minority groups.
III.C. Hating the Haters
One way to fight hatred is to broadcast messages that debunk hate-spreading messages about the out-group. Such strategies run the risk of suggesting that the out-group sympathizer is a tool of the hated out-group. A more common strategy is to build hatred against the hate-creating politician. This strategy of hating-the-haters is a mainstay of fights against discriminatory systems. The nonviolent protest movements of Gandhi and Martin Luther King were effective, in part, because they built hatred against their opponents. The power of nonviolent protest comes from images in which racists can be seen as violent attackers instead of victims. The pictures of Bull Conner turning the hoses and dogs on Civil Rights marchers became etched into the minds of liberal Northerners. Likewise, the Holocaust made the evil of the Nazis so apparent that the haters of Jews themselves became the objects of hatred.
Let L ϭ R ϭ 0, and assume that at a cost A ϩ ␣, if the antiredistribution candidate spread hatred, the proredistribution candidate can take advantage of the antiredistribution candidate's spreading of hatred by suggesting that the candidate himself is evil. If the antiredistribution candidate spread hatred and if the proredistribution candidate pays A ϩ ␣, then both outgroup members and in-group members who searched and learned that the negative signal is false will believe that the antiredistribution candidate will impose costs of Ͼ 0. These costs reflect the costs of having a "bad," hate-mongering leader who will do bad things in addition to the policies already proposed. Haters cannot be convinced to "hate-the-hater"; they believe their hatred is entirely reasonable.
I assume that neither the electorate nor the opposing politician observes the value of A ϩ ␣. They know the value of A which is a constant and that ␣ is distributed according with a cumulative distribution function J(␣). PROPOSITION 5. There exists a value of ␣, denoted ␣*, at which the proredistribution candidate is indifferent between villainizing a hate-spreading antiredistribution candidate; at values of ␣ below ␣* the proredistribution candidate strictly prefers villainizing the hate-spreading antiredistribution candidate; and for values of ␣ above ␣* the proredistribution candidate prefers not villainizing the antiredistribution candidate.
If h(((1 Ϫ )r)/( ϩ (1 Ϫ ))) is sufficiently small, then the value of ␣* is falling and the value of K* is rising with A and c R , and if
then the value of ␣* is rising with H . Proposition 5 shows that the same logic that applies to hating the out-group applies to hating the hate-mongering leader. The proredistribution group is likely to hate the hater when the costs of spreading hate are low or when its costs of funds are low. When hating the hater becomes more feasible, then the initial incentive to spread hatred declines. Reducing the costs of transmitting hatred increases the level of hate; reducing the costs of vilifying hate-mongers decreases the level of hate. Thus, better information technology can either increase or decrease the amount of hate.
The comparative static on H suggests that widespread hate makes it less appealing to spread hate against the hater because in-group members who hate do not respond to this appeal. This result implies that hatred can display increasing returns that might generate multiple equilibria in a richer, dynamic setting. Once a large enough share of the population hates, the price of fighting hatred rises. This sheds light on why hateful regimes rarely seem to disappear without external pressure-once the level of hatred is sufficiently high, it is hard to induce people to hate the haters.
III.D. Noneconomic Issues, Multiple Issue Elections, and Exclusionary Policies
In many examples of hatred, policy divides do not concern income, but some other characteristic, like religion or other preferences. This can be accommodated by assuming that people differ by both income and another variable x which is distributed across the out-group and in-group populations following cumulative distributions F O x ٪ and F I x ٪, respectively, and where x denotes the average level of x in society. The simplest case occurs when net tax payments are ( x Ϫ x ) so redistribution is based only on x, not y. If the two candidates differ in their proposed level of , then the support for the high tax candidate will equal
where P refers to the share of the in-group population that fears the minority. Just as before, the high tax candidate will support hatred if the out-group is well endowed in the attribute that is being taxed, and the low tax candidate will support if the outgroup is poorly endowed in the attribute x.
All of the basic results follow, and the out-group will be a target for hatred if the minority is particularly unusual along the political divide. For example, if the relevant divide concerns religion and religious policies, the model would predict that Jews, not ethnic minorities who adhere to the national religion, would be an object of hatred. If politicians disagree over national policies toward some foreign country, then the nationals of the foreign country would be a particularly tempting object of hatred.
In an earlier version of this paper [Glaeser 2004 ], I explored hatred in a setting with two policy dimensions. The results in that setting again support the importance of complementarity between policies and hatred. The out-group becomes a target for hatred when it differs from the in-group along the policy divide that is most extreme. As policies become more extreme along the dimension in which the out-group is particularly different from the in-group, hatred becomes more tempting.
One particularly important policy divide concerns exclusionary policies, such as reducing immigration by the out-group or segregating the out-group (also explored in Glaeser [2004] ). Exclusionary policies can be seen as reducing the threat from the out-group which might be captured by reducing d in the model. Policies that reduce d will be more attractive to in-group members who hate, and as a result, politicians who support such policies will send negative signals about the out-group. This result explains why European opponents of immigration like Austria's Haider and France's Le Pen also vilify foreigners.
IV. EXAMPLE NO. 1: RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES
Woodward's The Strange Career of Jim Crow documents (and explains) the rise of anti-Black hatred in the American South between 1870 and 1900. He concludes that "wide agreement prevailed in the early [1900s] that there was less sympathy, tolerance, and understanding between the races than there had been during the Reconstruction period . . ." [2002, p. 96] . Prior to the Civil War, the usual Southern stereotype was that Blacks were inferior but not evil. Woodward documents a postbellum evolution in political rhetoric, scholarship, and the arts, where the "patronizing, sentimentalized and paternalistic" image of Blacks during the antebellum period is replaced by "intensive propaganda of white supremacy, Negrophobia and race chauvinism." Because of a "daily barrage of Negro atrocity stories," the familiar image of an inferior but not malign Black was replaced by the image of a lustful, violent, aggressive Black who had been guilty of crimes against Whites (and would commit them again, given the chance). Woodward quotes turn-of-the-century figures such as John Spencer Bassett, who wrote in 1903 that "there is today more hatred of whites for blacks and blacks for white than ever before," and John Graves of Georgia, who wrote that "the races are wider apart, more antagonistic than 1865" [p. 96].
Woodward's description is supported by other evidence. Using the ancestry.com electronic version of the Atlanta Constitution from 1868 to 1920, I searched for the keywords "negro murder" and "negro rape" to document Woodward's "barrage of Negro atrocity stories."
15 I counted the number of stories in the Atlanta Constitution with these keywords in each and divided them by the number of stories with the keyword "January" in the same year. I divided by the number of stories containing "January" to control for changes in the size of the paper and the completeness of the database (as in Glaeser and Goldin [2004] ). Figure I shows the pattern for "Negro Murder." The data on "Negro Rape" shows a similar pattern; the correlation between the two series is 68 percent. The incidence of stories focusing on Negro Rape and Negro Murder rose steadily after the Civil War. While there are issues with this evidence (for example, it would be helpful to control for the actual number of murders by Blacks, if such data existed), it does support Woodward's depiction of the rise of hate. The rise mirrors the rise and fall of lynching Blacks shown in Figure II . 16 All three series also show a decline in the prevalence of these stories starting in 1900, which the model should be able to explain.
Why did anti-Black hatred rise after the Civil War? In the antebellum period slave owners had little interest in spreading hatred against their own slaves. Hatred of Blacks might have led voters to support abolitionists, who favored sending slaves back to Africa, rather than those politicians who wanted to keep a 15. The Atlanta Constitution is available only for selected years at http:// www.ancestry.com/search/rectype/periodicals/news/dblist.aspx?tpϭ2&pϭ13. For each year, I searched on the keywords "negro rape," "negro murder," and "January." I then divided the number of hits for "negro rape" and "negro murder" by the number of hits for "January" in each year.
16. Lynching data come from the Historical American Lynching Project and are available at http://people.uncw.edu/hinese/HAL/HAL%20Web%20Page.htm. These data consist of a spreadsheet of all lynchings known to the organizers of the project. I have included only lynchings of African-Americans. large slave population living close to Whites. The apologists for slavery argued that slaves were inferior, not evil, and that slavery was beneficial for African-Americans. As Genovese [1992] writes "Southerners from social theorists to divines to politicians to ordinary slaveholders insisted fiercely that emancipation would cast blacks into a marketplace in which they could not compete and would condemn them to the fate of the Indians or worse."
The rise of hatred after the Civil War can be explained by changes in the political landscape, and in particular the rise of redistributive policies. After 1865, two political movements emerged whose policies would have improved Black welfare. In the immediate postwar period, freed slaves joined northern Republicans ("Carpetbaggers"), and this alliance dominated the South during Reconstruction. The traditional Southern elites, which favored Blacks less than the Republicans, used hatred to discredit their opponents: "to gain power to overthrow the carpetbaggers, the conservatives had enlisted the support of the aggres-FIGURE I Stories about "Negro Murder" in the Atlanta Constitution, 1868 Constitution, -1924 This figure presents data on stories from an online search of the Atlanta Constitution. The search engine used is available for selected years at http:// www.ancestry.com/search/rectype/periodicals/news/dblist.aspx?tpϭ2&pϭ13. For each year, I searched on the keywords "negro murder" and "January." I then divided the number of hits for "negro murder" by the number of hits for "January" in each year.
sively anti-Negro whites in the struggle for redemption" [Woodward 1951] . During this period the first Ku Klux Klan flourished, and negrophobic orators like Ben Tillman, who claimed that reconstruction was an attempt to "put white necks under black heels," first came to prominence.
After Republicanism was defeated in the late 1870s, the depression of the 1880s created fertile ground for this first American party committed to redistribution from rich to poor. The egalitarian Populists' initially sought support among poor farmers, regardless of race. Woodward [1951, p. 254] writes that "more important to the success of Southern Populism than the combination with the West or with labor was the alliance with the Negro;" and as a result, "populists of other Southern states followed the example of Texas, electing Negroes to their councils and giving them a voice in the party organization" [p. 256] . Watson [1892] , a leading Populist, defended Blacks against hatecreating allegations that Blacks are a threat: "I have no words which can portray my contempt for the white men, Anglo-Saxons, who can knock their knees together, and through their chattering teeth and pale lips admit that they are afraid the Negroes will 'dominate us.' "
The alliance between Populist and Black was the crucial factor leading to the reappearance of elite support for race hatred: "Alarmed by the success that the Populists were enjoying with their appeal to the Negro voter, the conservatives themselves raised the cry of 'Negro domination,' and white supremacy, and enlisted the Negrophobe elements" [Woodward 1951, p. 79] . Hatred was built on stories of past and present attacks by Blacks on the White community. "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman said that "we will not submit to [an African-American] gratifying his lust on our wives and our daughters without lynching him," that among Black males "murder and rape become a monomania," and that "the negro becomes a fiend in human form" [Bauerlein 2001, pp. 58 -59] . James Vardaman, a Governor of Georgia, "won office by campaigning against negro education," and said that "civilization cannot be suited to low-browed, veneered, semi-savage negroes" [Bauerlein, p. 30] .
Hatred finally moderated after 1900 because of a further political realignment. Accepting the power of racial hatred, the Populists dropped their attempts to recruit Black voters and endorsed both anti-Black policies and racial hatred. After 1900, "negrophobic declamations appeared in [Tom Watson's] editorials and public statements" [Bauerlein 2001, p. 19] . 17 The model suggests that hatred declines when there is little difference in parties' policies toward the out-group. When economic egalitarians endorsed Jim Crow policies, there was no party that supported African-Americans, so the incentive to supply anti-Black hatred disappeared.
Ironically, the fights against slavery during the Civil War and against Jim Crow during the 1960s Civil Rights Era depended on their own forms of hatred. Abolitionists emphasized the crimes of Southerners against Blacks, and Uncle Tom's Cabin remains a classic of hate creation. Union soldiers fought for many reasons (most unrelated to slavery), but a hard core of abolitionist soldiers saw violence as just retribution for the evils of slavery. For example, in 1861, an infantry captain (and Harvard gradu-ate) wrote "I want to sing 'John Brown' in the streets of Charleston, and ram red-hot abolitionism down their unwilling throats at the point of a bayonet" (cited in McPherson [1997, p. 19] ). The ability of the two sides to reach a compromise involving compensated emancipation in the 1850s was surely connected to the growing hatred of North and South for one another. In the Civil Rights Era, hatred of Southern racists was again a political tool. African-American leaders publicized the suffering of Blacks to Northern Whites. Southern leaders like Bull Conner helped the civil rights cause when he violently subdued peaceful civil rights demonstrators in front of cameras.
V. WHY GERMANY? ANTI-SEMITISM IN NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE
Like American hatred of Blacks, European hatred of Jews displays remarkable variation over time and space. In this section I try to use the model to understand the geographic variation in anti-semitism in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe and America. In Germany, Austria, and Russia, virulent anti-Semitic hatred grew over the late nineteenth century. France followed a similar pattern, but anti-Semitic hatred never grew as strong. In England, the United States, Italy, and Spain, anti-Semitic hatred was never a major element of political discourse.
The politically motivated hatred of Jews that flared in the late nineteenth century had roots in stories of Jewish crimes told over two millennia. Jews have been accused of "supernatural powers, international conspiracies, and the ability to wreck economies; using the blood of Christian children in their rituals, even murdering them for their blood; being in league with the Devil; controlling simultaneously both the levers of international capital and of Bolshevism" [Goldhagen 1997, p. 39] . The ultimate alleged Jewish crime was deicide. Historically, vilification of Jews was primarily religious. Anti-Semitic hatred served the purposes of the early Church, which wanted to eliminate competition, and laymen, who used hatred to legitimize expropriation of Jews' property. This historical hatred paved the way for the nineteenth century anti-Semites, by socially segregating Jews and by lending credibility to stories of Jewish malevolence.
German anti-Semitism did not start with Hitler. It rose steadily throughout the late nineteenth century as right-wing politicians used hatred to discredit Jewish left-wing politicians and left-wing policies that would help Jews. In this period, politi-cal debates in Germany, Russia, and France put Jews solidly on the left side of the political aisle. Today, we associate left-right divides with income redistribution, but the left-right divide in the nineteenth century concerned the issue of monarchy. Right-wing figures, like Bismarck and Metternich, fought not against income redistribution, but against constitutions and democracy. Traditional monarchs refused to accept that their power came from a constitutional contract with the people, and inevitably claimed that their power came from God.
18 As Kann [1974, p. 321 ] wrote about the Austrian empire, "a political system so flagrantly out of step with the spirit of the times needed at least one strong ideological ally; this ally by a process of elimination could only be the Church." These words could have written about many of Europe's nineteenth century monarchies.
Religious support for the monarchy was naturally accompanied by monarchical support for the Church. Thr church-crown partnership led to restrictions on Jewish rights, such as the Russian restriction of Jews of the Pale of Settlement. As Cohn [1956] wrote, "the Right (conservative, monarchical, 'clerical') maintained that there must be a place for the Church in the public order; the Left (democratic, liberal, radical) held that there can be no (public) Church at all," and as a result, "Jews supported the Left, then, not only because they had become unshakeable partisans of the Emancipation, but also because they had no choice; as far as the internal life of the Right was concerned, the Emancipation had never taken place, and the Christian religion remained a prerequisite for political participation."
In the 1870s, during the Kulturkampf, when Bismarck allied himself with the National Liberals against the church. While Bismarck's opponents used anti-Semitism against him, saying that "Jews actually govern us now" [Stern 1977, p. 187] , these scattershot attacks had limited effect because Bismarck was both too wily and far too pure a Junker to be convincingly tarred as a Jewish pawn. However, in 1878, when Bismarck ended the Kulturkampf, he turned on his former liberal allies. After this point, Bismarck, the Junkers, and the Catholic Center party on the right faced the liberals and increasingly the Social Democrats on the left. This rearrangement meant that Jews were no longer in 18. For example, King Frederick William IV of Prussia refused to become Emperor of Germany in 1848 because that title was being offered by an elected assembly.
the center with the Iron Chancellor himself, but on the left with the socialists. Since Jews would benefit from leftist policies, and there were some prominent Jewish left-wing politicians such as Rudolph Virchow and Eduard Lasker, right-wing leaders turned to anti-Semitic hatred.
Adolph Stoecker, an Evangelical pastor, court chaplain, and right-wing politician, was a typical anti-Semitic political entrepreneur. He "founded the Christian Social Workers party, hoping to win proletarian votes for the right" [Weiss 1996, p. 90] . Stoecker announced that "the social problem is the Jewish problem," "Israel must renounce its ambition to be master of Germany" [pp. 90 -91] , and "Stoecker shouted at leftists who disrupted his campaigns that the founders of German socialism, Ferdinand Lassalle and Karl Marx, were Jewish" [p. 94]. After anti-Semitism won Stoecker the election, other followed, and Conservative Party candidates also denounced the Jews [p. 91]. The official Catholic journal Germania urged its readers to "buy not from Jews" [p. 85] .
By 1892, the Conservative Party platform embraced antiSemitism and pledged to "do battle against the many-sided aggressive, decomposing, and arrogant Jewish influence on the life of our people" [Weiss 1996, p. 116] . Kaiser Wilhelm II institutionalized barriers against Jews. In 1870 Germany was a traditional anti-Semitic regime with deep prejudices but limited race hatred. In 1914 the country was laced with venom against the Jews. The Kaiser himself insisted that no German "should rest until [the Jews] have been destroyed and exterminated" [p. 126] .
After World War I, the apostles of anti-Semitism became even more aggressive. While anti-Semitic demagogues before 1914 (like Vienna's Karl Lueger) were anti-Semitic as a matter of political strategy not personal belief, the next generation of antiSemitic politicians (like Hitler) appears to have hated Jews, probably because of exposure to prewar anti-Semitism. Hitler and the Nazis used the standard tools of hatred-formation: "the Jews, as Hitler and the Nazis intoned obsessively, were seen to be the root cause of all of Germany's other afflictions, including the loss of the First World War, the evisceration of Germany's strength by the imposition of democracy, the threat posed by Bolshevism, the discontinuities and disorientations of modernity and more" [Goldhagen 1997, p. 85] . In Hitler's own words, "the Jew would really devour the peoples of the earth" [Hitler 1971, p. 452] . In Mein Kampf Hitler claimed that Jews lay behind almost all of his political opponents: Social Democrats were Jews ("I gradually became aware that the Social Democratic press was directed predominantly by Jews"), communists were Jews ("the Jewish doctrine of Marxism"), and the entire Weimer Republic was, according to Hitler, a Jewish state. Since Hitler's policies were so harmful to Jews, anti-Semitism was a natural complement to Nazi policies.
As the model suggests, Germany's anti-Semitism rose as a political tool used by opponents of policies such as equality before the law that might have helped the Jews. Openness to hatred was surely exacerbated by the fact that the Jews were such a small minority in Germany (about 1 percent). Far from being a freak happening, German anti-Semitism seems almost predictable, because the important political battles stood to impact Jews and because Jews were a small and relatively segregated minority.
In Russia, anti-Semitism was the result of battles between absolute monarchy and constitutionalism. Again, the Church supported the Tsar, and the Jews were inevitably on the other side. As Pipes writes [1974, p. 232] , "the entire ideology of royal absolutism in Russia was worked out by clergymen who felt that the interests of religion and church were best served by a monarchy with no limits to its power." Anti-Tsarist platforms were kinder to Jews, and as a result "Russified Jews were playing a conspicuous role in all the main radical movements; the revived Populist party (the Social Revolutionaries), anarchism (a force during the 1905 upheavals) and Marxism (the Social Democrats)" [Seltzer 1980, p. 238] . The Tsar predictably used anti-Semitism to discredit his opponents. During the first pogroms, "the police and army stood aside for several days while rioters looted and destroyed Jewish property." The Russian government engaged in "the overt manipulation of , by spreading stories of Jewish crimes, ritual murders and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which was written by a tsarist agent in the 1890s [Cohn 1967] .
In Austria, German nationalists, like Georg Schonerer and Karl Lueger, advocated a restructuring (if not dissolution) of the empire that would separate German gentiles from Eastern European Jews. Hatred of Jews complemented this policy, so in the 1880s Schonerer started uttering sentiments like "every German has the duty to help eliminate the Jews as much as he can" and "we consider anyone a renegade of his people who knowingly supports the Jews and their agents and comrades." Lueger claimed that "the Jews are not the martyrs of the Germans, but the Germans, the martyrs of the Jews" and that Jews "hatch cockatrice's eggs, and weave the spider's web." Lueger's antiSemitism was motivated by political ambition not private animosity. Privately, he said that anti-Semitism was "only a slogan used to bait the masses, and that he personally respected and appreciated many Jews and would never deliberately do an injustice to any of them" [Hamann 1999 ].
In France, the Ancien Regime, the restored Bourbon monarchs, and even Napoleon III were allied with the church. From the first French Revolution onward, the left was violently opposed to the church, and "a feud between clericals and anti-clericals poisoned the atmosphere for a generation and left a heritage of bitterness that endured until the mid-twentieth century" [Wright 1981, p. 241] . As French Jews who supported the left, the right turned to anti-Semitism. Journals like Le Libre Parole kept up a steady stream of hate-creating tales of Jewish crimes. Hatebuilding reached its apogee in the Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s in which the Army falsely accused a Jewish officer of being a German spy. However, 27 years of Republican government had given the French left many more resources than its German counterpart. The left built hate against the haters. In his famous tract J'Accuse, Emile Zola tapped into French antiroyalism and anticlericalism. Zola described the War Office that convicted Dreyfus as a "nest of Jesuits" prone to "inquisitorial and tyrannical methods." Zola excited the passions of the mob "by raising the bogy of 'Secret Rome' " [Arendt 1958, p. 113] .
Political anti-Semitism was generally absent from Italy from 1860 to 1935, and this absence presents evidence for the political roots of anti-Semitic hatred. Like Germany, Italy was unified by a king whose supporters were the postunification right, but Italy's right wing was implacably opposed by the Church because the unification of Italy in 1871 had involved the expropriation of Papal property. Pius IX excommunicated the King and pretty much anyone else involved in Italian politics. Since both the right and left were anticlerical, Jews were spread across the aisle and were politically irrelevant. As the model suggests, when the outgroup does not differ in a policy-relevant way, hatred serves no purpose.
In England and the United States, anti-Semitic hatred never became a significant political force in the nineteenth century. After 1689, Church-based divine right monarchism was a dead force in England and its colonies. Because the Church had become apolitical, English and American parties divided on economics, foreign policy, and abolition of slavery, and Jews were found on both sides of the political aisle in both countries (e.g., Disraeli, Judah Benjamin). As the model suggests, when out-groups are spread between the two parties, there is little incentive to spread hatred. As with anti-Semitic hatred in Europe and Anti-Black hatred in the South, anti-American hatred is built on stories of past and future crimes. Typical comments from Palestinian activists include "the U. S. and Israel are the source of terrorism in the world," "Palestinian children stand with Iraqi children against U. S. barbarism," and the "United States is a fundamental enemy which takes part and holds responsibility to the elimination of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian villages."
Hatred of the West, as opposed to hatred of America, has its roots in the struggle against the colonial empires of France and England that dominated the Middle East after the World War I. Some anticolonial groups, such as the Society of Muslim Brothers founded by Hassan Al-Bannah in 1928 were Islamic, but most of these groups were secular, some even militantly secular communists or nationalistic modernizers. The anticolonialists preached hatred against the colonial powers of England and France (as the United States did against England in 1776), and some groups supported the Nazis. For example, the "Green Shirts of the Young Egypt party had been received as fraternal delegates to the Nazi Congress in Nuremburg," and during the war "the main chant of the crowds was not meant to improve the morale of British soldiers: Ila'l-amam ya Rommel! (Forward Rommel!)" [Ali 2002, p. 97] .
Sayyid Qutb published his anti-American book The America I Have Seen in 1951, and anti-Americanism increased after that date, but many experts argue that as late as the 1960s, anticolonial and anti-West hatred was not particularly directed against the United States. As Zakaria [2001] wrote in Newsweek [quoting Mohamed Heikel, a prominent Egyptian journalist), while "Britain and France were fading, hated empires," the United States was not hated: "in the 1950s and 1960s it seemed unimaginable that the United States and the Arab world would end up locked in a cultural clash." The United States was not particularly relevant to the internal political struggles in the Middle East during this era, so hating the United States was not an advantageous strategy.
In the 1960s Gamal Nasser became the "main architect of Arab nationalist anti-Americanism" [Rubin and Rubin 2004, p. 164] . Nasser allied himself with the Soviet Union, and hatred of the United States was a natural complement to that policy. He particularly turned to anti-Americanism to explain his defeat in the 1967 war: "Egyptian schoolchildren were taught ever afterward the lie that the United States attacked Egypt and fought alongside Israel in the 1967 war" [p. 165] . However, during this era, anti-Americanism was built only by the tools of the secular state, not by the more powerful polemic skills of Islamic religious leaders. Anti-Americanism was a stronger complement to proSoviet Union secular nationalism than Islamic fundamentalism because "far from being anti-Islam in this era, U. S. policy became literally its political patron, seeing traditionalist Muslims like those in Saudi Arabia as a bulwark against Communism and radical Arab nationalism" [p. 165] .
This pattern changed when the United States became more strongly associated with particular Middle Eastern regimes, and anti-American hatred flared with the revolution against the Shah. No leader in the Persian Gulf area was as closely associated with the United States: the Central Intelligence Agency had led his coup against Mossadegh in 1953, and the United States supported his military. In return, the Shah's policies were proAmerican. Opposition to the Shah was the cause of communists (who were naturally anti-American) and religious activists. The communists relied on the time-tested messages against capitalist exploitation. Khomeini focused on how the Americans had, through the Shah, worked to destroy traditional Islam.
Anti-American propaganda exploded after the revolution. Initially, the Ayatollah and his Islamic Revolutionary Council seemed unlikely to rule postrevolution Iran. However, the Islamic Revolutionary Council used anti-American sentiment to discredit their more moderate competitors and establish control over the country. The Ayatollah preached against the more moderate elements in the revolution, emphasizing their pro-Western elements and connections to the "Great Satan"-America.
The taking of American hostages was called an act of righteous retribution, "protesting the Shah's admission to the United States for treatment of the cancer that would kill him shortly afterward"
19 [Kepel 2002, p. 114] . The takeover of the embassy produced evidence of "U. S. contacts with a number of middleclass liberals," and "these revelations were promptly used as a pretext for new trials, executions, and confiscations of property." Since 1979, the religious leaders of Iran have regularly used hatred against the United States as a political weapon to fight against moderate opponents whose policies might lead to reconciliation with America.
Elsewhere in the Arab world, anti-Americanism grew in the 1990s, serving a variety of political interests. Dictators opposed to the United States, like Saddam Hussein, naturally built support for their regimes by fomenting hatred. As Arafat brought the Palestinian Liberation Organization closer to the United States and Israel, first by accepting the existence of Israel in 1988 and then with the Madrid Conference (in 1991) and the Oslo Accords (1994), Arafat's rival Hamas "appealed to those opposed to the PLO's diplomatic initiative, calling the organization a hostage to 'Israeli duplicity' " [Kepel 2002, p. 156] . Hamas generated support by emphasizing the evils of the Israelis and the Americans.
In Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the regimes are allied with America for financial and security reasons, opponents of the 19. The fact that the United States' crime in this case was admitting a sick man for medical treatment underscores my previous claim that it appears possible to be able to make almost any act appear vicious and worthy of vengeance. regimes also preach hatred against the United States as a means of discrediting the incumbent regimes. In Egypt, groups such as the Gamaat Islamiya have used hatred to build support against the Mubarak regime. 20 In Saudi Arabia, Osama Bin Laden "invites the faithful to forgo their differences and unite against the Al-Saud family, who have 'collaborated with the Zionist-Crusader alliance' " [Kepel 2002, p. 318] . The spread of hatred has been so effective that the Saudi regime itself-which is closely tied to the United States-has echoed the anti-American mantras of its opposition.
Anti-American hatred became widespread in the Middle East for two reasons. First, the Gulf's oil means that policies of Gulf countries toward America can really hurt or help the United States. America has therefore become closely tied to a number of regimes for strategic and economic reasons. Second, very few Americans are actually involved directly with citizens of the Middle East's countries. The social interactions which make hatred costly do not exist. This combination of America's political relevance (which creates the incentives for supply) and the absence of interactions (which ensures that there is little desire to know the truth) fosters the spread of hatred in this region.
Why did Islamic anti-Americanism balloon in the 1990s? Until the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was a major player in the Middle East, and communists and nationalists (like Nasser) had strong ties to the Soviet Union. In this era, it was the communists, not the Islamic Fundamentalists, who proposed policies that were most hostile to United States interests. If the clerics had nurtured hatred against the United States, they would have only pushed support toward their communist opponents. Only after the communists disappeared politically did the Islamic Fundamentalists become the most anti-American party, and only then did they start fomenting hatred. In retrospect, it seems clear that fundamentalist clerics are much better at promulgating anti-Americanism than their nationalist predecessors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The history of hatred suggests that when people are willing to listen, political entrepreneurs can create hatred. By telling tales of past and future crimes, people can be convinced that some out-group is dangerous. This paper identifies conditions under which we should expect to see the congruence of a supply of hatred and a willingness to listen to hatred (the demand). The supply of hatred is created by political competition. When policy alternatives would have disparate impact on the minority group, then the politicians supporting the antiminority policy will tend to use hatred. As a result, left-wing politicians will build hatred against rich minorities, and right-wing politicians will build hatred against poor minorities. Other policies, like excluding immigrants or segregating minorities, can also complement hatred. When minorities are more different from the majority along a policy-relevant dimension, then minorities are more tempting targets for hatred.
Citizens' willingness to accept false hate-creating stories is determined by the costs and returns to acquiring information. People who interact frequently with minorities in peaceful settings will be less likely to accept false stories. Hatred is particularly likely when out-groups are politically relevant, but socially segregated.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Proposition 1. The benefits from search equal ((1 Ϫ )r)/( ϩ (1 Ϫ )) so search is therefore optimal if and only if s is less than this amount.
Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating equation (2) with respect to P yield Proof of Proposition 3. If the antiredistribution candidate chooses not to spread hate, then his support equals 1 Ϫ pF 0 ( ŷ ) Ϫ (1 Ϫ p) F I ( ŷ ). The gain in support from spreading hate is
making hate optimal if and only if this gain is greater than c A K. Let K* denote
and the first part of the proposition follows.
To find comparative statics, we recognize that ϭ G(K*); i.e., the probability that people assign to politicians spreading false stories is itself determined by the proportion of politicians whose costs are low enough to spread stories. The equality can be written as K* ϭ V(Z, (Z)) ϭ V(Z, G(K*(Z)), where V(⅐, ⅐) represents
and Z represents all of the exogenous parameters. Differentiation with respect to Z then yields ‫ץ‬K*/‫ץ‬Z ϭ V Z /(1 Ϫ V g(K*)). Differentiation shows that V Ͻ 0. The sign of ‫ץ‬K*/‫ץ‬Z will be the same as the sign of V Z , and differentiation shows that (a) In this case, when the antiredistribution candidate does not spread hate, his support equals
and K* equals 1/c A times this amount, which is falling with .
(b) If s ϭ ŝ ϩ , where ŝ is a constant and is distributed with cumulative distribution ⌫(), then K* is
which is rising with Ĉ .
(c) For this part of the proposition, I note that K ϭ K ϩ v, and I define v* ϭ K* Ϫ K , and the probability that an antiredistribution candidate spreads a negative signal is ⌿(v*). The value of v* equals
The derivative of v* with respect to K is negative, and ⌿(v*) declines with K .
Proof of Proposition 4. The gains from spreading hatred for the candidate who proposes little redistribution is
and the maximum amount that this candidate will spend on redistribution equals 1/c A times this amount. Again, define V(, K*()) as 1/c A times this quantity, and differentiation again reveals that the sign of ‫ץ/*‪K‬ץ‬ will be the same as the sign of ‫.ץ/‪V‬ץ‬ Differentiation then shows that ‫ץ/‪V‬ץ‬ is always negative as long as
It then follows that K* is decreasing with ( R Ϫ A )/( R Ϫ A ), so K* will be rising with A , falling with R , and rising with R Ϫ A if and only if A Ͼ R .
Proof of Proposition 5. The value of ␣* that equalizes the benefits and costs of hating the haters equals To determine ‫,*␣ץ/*‪K‬ץ‬ I return to the optimization problem for the antiredistribution candidate. The gains to the antiredistribution candidate from spreading hatred equals
and K* equals 1/c A times this amount. Differentiating this with respect to ␣* yields Ϫj͑␣*͒ ΄ p
